双边过度自信下科技企业孵化器与创业者博弈及协调

Game Model and Coordination of Business Incubators and Entrepreneurs Based on Bilateral Overconfidence

研究双边过度自信下孵化器管理者和创业者合作的纳什和斯坦克尔伯格均衡模型,以及过度自信对双方努力水平和效用的影响,并比较2种均衡下过度自信和财政政策对双方行为的影响。研究表明,在纳什和斯坦克尔伯格2种均衡以及过度自信下,孵化器管理者和创业者均衡努力水平分别大于理性条件下双方均衡努力水平;双方过度自信程度越大,过度自信下孵化器管理者和创业者的均衡努力水平也越大;孵化器管理者和创业者之间相互作用对创业企业成功率影响越大,理性条件下和过度自信下双方的努力水平都越大;双方过度自信下,斯坦克尔伯格模型下的创业者努力水平较纳什均衡下高。

This paper studies the cooperation of a business incubator manager and an entrepreneur under the bilateral overconfidence circumstances that have an influence on the efforts and the effective- ness of both sides. We use Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium to compare the overconfi- dence and fiscal policies on the impact of differences in behavior of both sides. Studies have shown that the overconfident business incubator manager and the entrepreneur enjoy a higher level of effort than rational ones in the Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium. The greater of the degree of overconfidence is, the higher equilibrium level of effort the business incubator manager and the entrepreneur have. The interaction between managers and entrepreneurs has a positive impact on the success rate of start-ups, the greater impact is, the greater equilibrium level of effort is, no matter how rational or overconfident business incubator managers and entrepreneurs are. For overconfident entrepreneurs, the equilibrium efforts of Stackelberg model are higher than Nash model.