基于委托-代理模型的食品安全规制研究

Research on Food Safety Regulation Based on Principal-agent Model

在食品安全规制中,地方政府为自身利益最大化,可能与当地食品企业合谋,从而导致规制无效。基于此,文章从非对称信息的角度,运用委托-代理模型分析了食品安全规制中中央政府与地方政府的委托代理关系以及地方政府与食品企业发生合谋的条件,并通过模型研究得出了中央政府加大查处食品安全事故的概率、加大对食品企业和地方政府合谋行为的惩罚,能够显著提高食品安全规制效果的结论。并提出相应的优化我国食品安全规制的对策。

In the food safety regulation, the local governments tend to conspire with the local food enterprises in order to pursue their own interests to maximum, which leads to the invalid of food safety regulation. Based on this, the article analyzed the principal-agent relationship between the central government and local governments as well as the conditions that the collusion between local governments and food companies occurs in the food safety regulation using the principal-agent model from the perspective of asymmetric information. By model analysis, we obtained the conclusion that the increase of probability to investigate the food safety incidents and punishment of collusion between the local governments and food enterprises for the central government can significantly improve the effectiveness of food safety regulation. Furthermore, the corresponding measures to optimize the China＇s food safety regulation have been put forward.