新型城镇化背景下环境污染的博弈分析

A Game Analysis on Environmental Pollution under the Background of the New Urbanization

新型城镇化建设中环境污染问题的实质是中央政府、地方政府、企业和农民四方利益主体博弈的结果。通过建立纳什均衡模型、贝叶斯纳什均衡、子博弈完美纳什均衡及一般博弈模型,对四方利益主体的行为进行博弈分析,得出了如下结论:保护环境是中央政府的占优策略;地方政府之间恶性竞争会造成"囚徒困境";政府与企业之间为完全信息动态博弈,企业策略的选择取决于政府的执行力度;农民是否举报企业的污染行为,在不同的经济发展阶段会有不同的选择。

Environmental pollution problems under the background of the new urbanization are the result of the muhipartite games for benefits among the central government, local government, enterprise and farmer. By establishing the Nash equilibrium model, the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium model, the Sub -game perfect Nash equilibrium model and the General game model to analyze the behavior of the muhipartite games for benefits among these four main characters, we have the following conclusion： Firstly, protecting the environment is the central government~ dominant strategy. Secondly, cutthroat competition will result in ＂prisoner＇s dilemma＂ between local governments. Thirdly, government and enterprise are in the situation of dynamic games with complete information. Therefore, enterprise＇ s strategic choice depends on the implementation of environmental policy. Finally, there will be different options at different stages of economic development whether farmer charge the pollution behavior of enterprise or not.