摘要
在现行土地征收增值收益分配制度安排中,地方政府通过以原用途和年产值为核心制定的征地补偿方式分配农地征收增值收益的"显"性分配规则在实践中的执行性和公正性受到质疑。"显"规则忽视了土地征收行为可能造成征收人和被征收之间的利益冲突,缺乏明确有效的救济措施。地方政府为实现征地目标,有意识地默许通过"显"规则之外的途径——"潜"规则来提高补偿额以消弭潜在的不稳定因素。但是双规则共存的土地增值分配机制背离了社会公正与经济稳定发展的目标,必须缩小或杜绝分配的"潜"规则,在不同层面对"显"规则进行系统设计。
In the institutional arrangement, the enforceability and justice of the "obvious" rules have been queried, which local government distributes farmland appreciation by the core of original purposes and annual output. "obvious" rules ignore conflict of interest between collector and expropriator, and lacks specific relief measures. Local government acquiesces to get through "hidden" rules to raise compensation to eliminate potential destabilizing factor. Double -rules deviate from goal of social justice and economic steady development. It must reduce or stop motion of "hidden" rules, and reform "obvious" rules in different aspects.
出处
《经济问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第7期75-79,107,共6页
On Economic Problems