科学中的价值与客观性：价值负载性、多元主义和认知态度

Values and Objectivity in Science: Value-ladenness, Pluralism and Epistemic Attitude

与强调科学家的观点必须和事实相符的培根式观念相比,多元主义的客观性关注的是在冲突的进路之间寻求批判性竞争。多元主义从科学理论的实质性假设扩展到科研中的价值领域。认知价值的多元性有助于达到更符合科研现实状况的客观性形式,它保留了科学客观性中大部分符合直觉的东西,也是唯一能够克服偏好型偏见的方式。除此以外,科学研究的另一大特性是追求共识,其基础是共享一种认知态度,此态度表现在科学家愿意服从经验的细究、尊重理性论证,以及科学共同体在判别知识断言时采取的规则方面。多元主义和达成共识的和谐关系可以从不同层次来说明:一个是科学推理的层次,另一个是社会约定的层次,后者关注的是如何处理共同体中的知识断言。

The paper addresses the nature of objectivity in science and its relation to values. I contrast a Baconian notion of objectivity, expressing a correspondence of the views of scientists to the facts, with a pluralist notion, involving a critical debate between conflicting approaches. These conflicts include substantive hypotheses or theories but extend to values as well. I claim that a plurality of epistemic values serves to accomplish a non-Baconian form of objectivity that is apt to preserve most of the intuitions tied to the objectivity of science. For instance, pluralism is the only way to cope with the challenge of preference bias. However, in addition to pluralism at the level of theories and value-commitments alike, scientific research is also characterised by a joint striving for consensus which I trace back to a shared epistemic attitude. This attitude manifests itself, e.g., in the willingness of scientists to subject their claims to empirical scrutiny and to respect rational argument. This shared epistemic attitude is embodied in rules adopted by the scientific community concerning general principles of dealing with knowledge claims. Pluralism and consensus formation can be brought into harmony by placing them at different levels of consideration: at the level of scientific reasoning and at the level of social conventions regarding how to deal with claims put forward within the scientific community.