普通高等院校激励扭曲现象实证研究

An Empirical Study of Incentive Distortion Measurements on Ordinary College

教育部与高校之间是委托代理关系,作为委托人,如何有效激励高校培养有能力的人才一直是教育部重要工作之一。选取我国100所高等院校2013年就业率与通用就业力排名数据,进行激励扭曲测量,发现在普通高等院校中存在激励扭曲现象。主要是高校之间的恶性竞争、就业率统计不规范、激励机制设置不合理等造成的。为此,可以从完善就业率概念、合理设置统计时间、完善评估体系和切实提高学生就业能力四个方面来改善。

The relationship between the Ministry of Education and universities is ota the basis of principal-agent theory. As agents, how to effectively encourage colleges to train talented people has been an important work of the Ministry of Education. This paper selects the employment statistics and the general labor ability data from 100 universities in China in 2013 to promote the incentive distortion measurement, finding that the incentive distortion phenomenon exists in ordinary colleges and universities. The malignant competition between colleges, the nonstandard employment rate statistics and the unreasonable incentive mechanism result in this existence. Therefore, to improve it, it can be started from perfecting employment concept, setting up reasonable statistical time, improving the evaluation system as well as enhancing the students＇ ability to get jobs.