摘要
供应链成员间的信息共享对其决策至关重要。在下订单前,为了能让供应商设置足够的产能,制造商向供应商汇报其预估的需求,由于与供应商对需求的判断有差异,这会导致供应商对制造商产生潜在的不信任。对这种不信任建模,将其看作是一个概率随机变量,通过价格补偿的方式来降低风险。两阶段的博弈方法首先谈定补偿价格,然后再对汇报需求和产能做决策。该分析和数值算例验证了决策过程,也表明了模型的有效性。
Demand information sharing between supply chain members affects supply chain contract decisions. This paper manufacture reports demand to suppliers before placing orders, but the gap between manufacture' s report and supplier' s forecast demands will induce potential distrust from supplier to manufacture (for trying to gain supplier' s capacity/quota). It models the distrust risk as a probability random variable, and mitigate the risk with price compensation. The two-stage game-theory based decisions first negotiate compensation price and then decide order/supply quantity. Analytical analyses and numerical examples provide managerial insights and illustrate the efficiency of the decisions.
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第7期105-109,共5页
Soft Science
基金
国家自然科学基金重点项目(70732003)
关键词
供应链管理
信息共享
价格补偿
信任
supply chain management
information sharing
price compensation
trust