丹尼特意识理论评析

An Analysis of Dennett's Consciousness theory

在丹尼特的意识理论中,意识研究的方法论具有重大意义,是其意识理论体系的建构基础和论证前提。丹尼特坚持意识的自然演化理论,但却反对意识的现象学特征,否认感受质的实在性,主张以功能主义的多重实现为意识理论的基本构架。丹尼特所谓的"意识"应当被区分为两种形式,一种是民间心理学范畴中的意识,一种是科学范畴中的意识。前者来自于主体在特定文化语境中形成的感知判断,这种意识形式不属于科学研究的范畴;后者则关涉意识的实现机制,可以通过科学方法以算法或计算状态被多重实现。

In Dennett＇s Consciousness Theory, research into methodology of consciousness is of great importanee, which postulates his analysis of consciousness. Dennett persists in the natural evolution theory of consciousness, but he refutes phenomenological characters of consciousness in scientific research and he argues that multiplerealization of functionalism should be the basic structure of consciousness. Dennett mixes some attributions of functionalism, eliminativism, pragmatism and logical behaviorism, but we could not be incorporated into any kind of theory simply. Dennett＇s socalled consciousness should be divided into two kinds： one belongs to folk psychology category while the other belongs to scientific category. The former comes from percepti,：eness of agency in some kind of cultural context which is not in scientific research scope. The latter concerns the realization mechanism of consciousness which would be realized by algorithm or computational states.