摘要
作为当前中国反腐败的核心机构,纪检监察组织在中国政治的演变和发展中起着非常关键的作用,但是以往对于这一问题的研究苦于资料的缺乏而无从深入。论文使用对乡镇一级纪委书记的调查问卷作为一手实证资料,对纪检监察机构在中国乡镇及以下的治理单位中监督职能的实际执行状况进行了深入分析。论文研究发现,乡镇一级纪检监察组织对于乡镇党委政府主要领导成员和重要事项的监督都存在一定的漏洞,造成监督不力的根本原因不是人员和资金的缺乏,而是制度设计上的双重领导体制和基层监督组织的"多任务性"。论文研究表明,目前对中国纪检监察机构的两项改革——突出主要业务和加强上级纪委对下级纪委的领导——是提升纪检监察机构监督能力的重要举措。
As the core anti- corruption organization, discipline inspection and supervision organization makes the key role in the evolution and development of China's politics,but the researches on this problem are always unable further since lack of data.This paper used the data from the questionnaire on secretaries of town disciplineinspection commission as the first hand empirical material,deeply analysed how the supervision function of the discipline inspection and supervision organization actually works in China's town. Our research found that,the town discipline inspection and supervision organization's supervision on main leaders and important matters all have loopholes,the basic reason is not in short of staff or money,but in Dual- leadership and multi- tasks from system design. Our research demonstrated that,the two acting reform measures such as focusing on main business and strengthening the leadership from higher discipline inspection commission to lower discipline inspection commission are useful important measures to enhance the supervision function of the discipline inspection and supervision organization.
出处
《公共行政评论》
CSSCI
2014年第3期107-132,178-179,共26页
Journal of Public Administration
基金
国家社会科学基金青年项目:“东亚儒家文化圈预防腐败制度研究及对中国的启示研究”(11CZZ015)
复旦大学青年教师科研能力提升项目“中国城市公民的反腐败效能感研究”(20520132026)
2011年国家社科基金特别委托项目“纪检监察学科建设研究”(11@ZH010)
关键词
反腐败
乡镇纪检组织
监督能力
双重领导
多任务性
Anti-Corruption
the Town Discipline Inspection and Supervision Organization
Supervision Function
Dual-leadership
Multi-Tasks