随机需求下基于航次博弈的内河港航激励机制研究

Study on Game-based Inland Voyage Incentive Mechanism under Stochastic Demand

以供应链契约为理论基础,以内河港口和内河承运人为研究对象,对两者之间的航次博弈问题进行建模分析,通过在两者之间建立合理的激励机制,实现双方服务能力的协调和盈利水平的"双赢"。假设内河运输需求服从随机分布且航次成本信息对称,在合作博弈和非合作博弈思想的指导下,定量分析和比较了港口费率折扣(Handling Charge Discount Contract,简称HC)、航次补贴(Voyage Subsidy Contract,简称VS)、收益共享(Revenue Sharing Contract,简称RS)三种契约的协调效果。同时还探讨了港口经营人和内河承运人的风险偏好对收益共享契约协调效果的影响。研究成果能够为内河港口企业和内河承运人提供一定的决策指引。

In this paper, on the basis of the supply chain contract theory and with the inland ports and inland river carriers as the subject, we modeled and analyzed the game between the two and by building a reasonable incentive mechanism for the two parties, realized the coordination of their service capacity as well as the win-win of their revenue levels. Then assuming the demand for inland transportation followed stochastic distribution and that the information concerning voyage cost was symmetric, we quantitatively analyzed and compared the coordinating effects of the handling charge discount contract, the voyage subsidy contract and the revenue sharing contract. At the end, we discussed how the risk preference of the port operators and inland carriers influence the effect of the revenue sharing contract.