摘要
文章以我国上证A股制造业上市公司2005—2012年的数据为样本,实证检验了公司治理结构与过度投资的关系。结果表明:上市公司第一大股东持股比例对过度投资有显著影响,而其股权制衡度和上市公司终级控制人性质对企业过度投资行为的抑制作用并不明显;董事会规模对过度投资的影响也不显著,但独立董事比例能够有效抑制过度投资;经理层薪酬水平提高反而加剧了我国制造业上市公司的过度投资行为,而经理层持股机制的作用不明显。
Based on China＇s Shanghai A share manufacturing Listing Corporation 2005 -2012 data as the sample, an empirical test of the relationship between the corporate governance and over-investment has been carried out. The results show that the proportion of the first shareholder of the Listing Corporation has a signifi- cant effect on over-investment, but the equity balance degree of inhibition and listing Corporation ultimate con- troller properties on the over-investment behavior is not obvious, the impact of board size on over-investment is not significant either, however, the proportion of independent directors can curb the excessive investment. The rise of managers＇ salary exacerbates the over-investment behavior of Listing Corporation in a certain extent, but the manager shareholding mechanism can not play its due role in its investment behavior.
基金
杭州电子科技大学人文社会科学研究基金(KYF145613005)
关键词
公司治理结构
过度投资
制造业
实证分析
corporate governance structure
over-investment
manufacturing industry
empirical analysis
