国有股权与公司IPO中的审计师选择行为及动机

State Ownership and Auditor Choice in IPO Market

审计师选择是审计研究的核心问题。本文首次研究了国有股权在中国A股IPO市场对审计师选择的影响及其具体机制。我们发现,国有股比例越高,公司选择高质量的审计师的概率越低;当国有股权比例较低时,高质量的审计师能够降低IPO发行抑价,但是,国有股比例的提高会损害高质量审计师降低IPO抑价的作用,并且,国有股比例越高,IPO抑价越高。这说明国有股权对IPO中的审计师选择的影响既不是因为国有股比例的提高容易导致公司与低质量的审计师合谋,也不是因为国有股权可以代替高质量的审计师在降低IPO融资成本过程中的作用,而是因为国有股权会损害高质量审计师声誉机制的发挥,进而损害了其在降低IPO融资成本过程中的作用。本文对于丰富和深化我们关于中国A股市场审计师选择行为和审计师声誉机制作用发挥的认识,具有非常重要的作用。

Auditor choice is the core issue of auditing research. This paper first studies how state ownership impacts on auditor choice and its specific mechanism in Chinese A- share IPO market. We find that probability of choosing high quality auditors decreased with state ownership ratio. The high quality auditors can reduce IPO underpricing when state ownership ratio is low. However,increasing the proportion of state- owned shares will damage the function of high quality auditors reduce IPO underpricing. It suggests that state ownership impacts on auditor choice of IPOs is because of state ownership damages high quality auditor's role in reducing IPO financing cost,which decrease the demand of high quality auditor.