摘要
通过两金融机构之间的静态博弈模型,分析了金融监管的效率机制,得出了以下结论:在设立金融监管机制时最关键的是金融主管部门要制定对无视金融监管的金融机构的惩罚措施,也就是制定惩罚因子θ,在θ确定的条件下接受监管是金融机构的最终选择。
Efficient mechanism of financial supervision system is analyzed throuqh the use of a model of static game between two financial organizations.The conclccsion is drawn that the government design and establish an efficient mechanism of financial supervision to render publishment to those who reject it,which is the essential point to the system;thus,throuqh a punishment factorθ ,financial organizations will fiually accept the aupervision.
出处
《江西教育学院学报》
2000年第6期75-77,共3页
Journal of Jiangxi Institute of Education
关键词
金融监管
静态博弈
效率机制
博弈分析
financial supervision
noncooperative static game under perfect information
efficient mechanism of financiol supervision