公司收购与目标公司股东收益的实证分析

An Empirical Analysis of Target Shareholder's Returns

现代西方公司控制权市场理论的主流学派认为 ,在由公司各种内外部控制机制构成的控制权市场上 ,公司内部控制机制没有发挥其主要作用 ,只有作为外部控制机制的收购才是最为有效的控制机制 ,因为公司间的收购能给目标公司股东带来利益。本文以这种理论为背景 ,对申华实业被收购案进行实证研究。实证分析的主要结果表明 ,在我国目前的市场条件下 ,二级市场收购并不能给目标公司带来收益。

The theory of market for corporate control believes that the takeover as an external control is the most effective measure of controlling a corporation in the market instead of the internal control.It argues that takeover of a corporation would increase the shareholder's returns.By the theory,we examine empirically the case of takeover of Shenhua Corporation.The main idea is to test Chinese implication of theory of market for corporate control.The results of this statistical analysis show that the takeover of Shenhua did not increase the target shareholder's returns in China's stock market.