证券投资基金中的委托代理问题

Principal-agent problems in security investment fund

从分析证券投资基金的委托代理关系入手 ,讨论了由于基金存在两级契约安排所引起的逆选择和道德风险问题 ,提出只有设计一系列制度安排以减少信息成本和激励成本 ,投资基金才能凭借其特有的优势 ,发挥出集合投资、分散风险、专家理财、企业监控的功能。具体探讨了第一、第二级契约安排中的委托代理问题。

On the basis of Principal-Agent theory,this article discusses the adverse selection and moral hazard issue arising from the two-stage contracts in fund. And then it puts forward that only with a series of institutional arrangement,can Security Investment Funds play the following functions,such as pooling capital, professional finance,risk reduction via diversification and monitoring. In the first-stage contract,we can reduce the information processing cost and asymmetric information by institutionalization of investors and signaling,and induce agent to maximize the principal's preferences with risk-shared contract and reputation. In the second-stage contract,since Investment Fund itself is an institutional solution to monitoring problems,the key to solve the agency problems is dependent on whether the fun wish and could fundction as a monitor.