超额信贷风险分析

Excess Credit Risk Analysis

政府干预是一把双刃剑，经济起飞时期，它可以弥补市场信息不对称的缺陷，降低信贷活动的成本，甚至是提高信贷配置的效率；但政府干预并不是无条件、无成本的，其作用前提逐步削弱时，政府往往以强制合同的形式实施干预，强制合同收益与风险不平衡的分摊机制通常会加剧金融机构的道德风险与逆向选择，形成比内生信贷风险更高比例的信贷风险--超额信贷风险。

The government intervention is two－ edged, at the time of economic take－ off, it can make up the defect coming from market information asymmetry, reduce the lending activity cost, even increase the efficiency of credit allocation. At the same time, the government intervention is conditional and costly, once its operation precondition weakens gradually, the government usually carries the intervention into execution in the form of compulsive contract. The compulsive contract has the lopsided apportion system for gains and risk, it often aggravates moral hazard and adverse selection, which forming the risk more venturous than inherent credit risk-- excess credit risk.