摘要
近年来 ,在中国境内 ,跨国纳税人从事国际逃税、国际避税活动屡见不鲜 ,出口骗税十分猖獗。阿林汉姆 -桑德姆预期效用最大模型、本杰米尼 -梅塔尔逃税决策相互依赖模型等理论对此不能作出恰当的解释。本文首次揭示了国际洗税行为 ,并发现上述跨国纳税人纳税不服从行为与国际洗税密切相关。本文还通过建立一个博弈模型对国际洗税内在动机进行了剖析 ,并在此基础上提出了政策建议。
Recently, transnational taxpayers are often engaged in international tax evasion, international tax avoidance and international tax cheating within China. Allingham Sandmo Model and Benjamini Maital Model can't give appropriate explanations in this regard. It's the first time that this article disclosed international tax laundering behaviour and found out the close relation between transnational taxpayers'noncompliance and international tax laundering. Moreover, this article analyzes the intrinsic motive of international tax laundering by establishing a game model, and gives policy advices about it.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2001年第3期61-68,共8页
Economic Research Journal