非正式制度安排、技术约束下的农村信用合作社发展问题:抚州个案研究与一般政策结论

Development of Rural Creedit Cooperatives under the Informal Institutional Arrangement and Technology Restriction

在逻辑上 ,中国当前最大的问题仍然是农民问题 ,农民的根本问题仍然是农村经济发展问题 ,现代农村 (无论是发达地区还是欠发达地区 )经济发展问题的关键环节是金融问题。本文通过对江西抚州农村信用合作社的调查研究 ,试图透过农村信用合作社分散性、多样性、复杂性的表象把握我国多年农村信用合作社改革飘摇不定、进退失据的内在非正式制度背景和技术约束 ,并提出以下观点 :第一、条块的利益争夺和责任推诿造就了农村信用合作社决策的非主体性特征和“最后责任人”角色 ;第二 ,合作金融与行政主导 (无论来自条还是块 )双主线的伴生与排异造成两线同时面临困境 ;第三 ,下一步改革的主导思路只能是 :必须在市场导向和行政主导间择其一 ,无论从第一线监管者角度出发 ,还是作为旁观性的研究人员 ,我们都倾向于选择前者。最后 ,与不合理制度安排相伴生的不合理技术安排同样是约束农村信用合作社发展的致命问题。

Logically,rural development is critical for China′s further development;while financial development is critical for current rural economic development.Based on the survey on the rural credit cooperative system in Fuzhou city,this paper explains the informal institutional background and technological constraints for which the whole rural financial system′s less efficient performance and non-optimal previous reform arrangement.Some crucial propositions are drawn as following.Firstly,the interest conflict between central and regional authorities leads to the rural credit cooperatives′non-independence but full responsibility in their operation.Secondly,the target-conflict shapes the potential credit risk which finally should be solbved by central and regional governments.Therdly,the reform is on the crossroad,i.e.market orientation or administrative orientation,and if the latter is our choice,the next crossroad is between regional control or state control.It is no doubt that the formers are better in both selections,by views of supervision and academic research as well.Finally,the technological weakness resulted from the informal institutional arrangement is also fatal for rural credit cooperatives.