产权化激励机制的定量分析

Quantitative Analysis of Incentive Mechanism Containing Property Rights

传统的委托(代理理论的激励机制设计存在着诸多缺陷，并导致其失灵。该文立足于经济知识化的时代背景，提出了“智能雇佣资本”的观点，建立现代综合激励模式。依据该模式，设计了产权化激励机制，并定量分析了其激励机制的结构。

There are many defects that cause inefficiency in design of incentive mechenism for classic principal-agent theory. This paper builds a synthetic motive model on the basis of the economic times and intellectualization and intelligence hires capital. A new incentive mechanism is set up in which property rights is contained, and its structure is also analyzed quantitatively. It is shown that it is important for the manager to enjoy his property rights in order to keep the enterprise stead and active.