基于企业套期的最优信息披露策略

The Optimal Hedging Information Disclosure on Corporate Hedging

企业套期是企业利用金融创新产品及金融衍生工具以消除企业在经营中所面临的一系列与收入现金流相关的不确定性所采取的策略。本文在股东与管理者代理冲突的指导框架下 ,阐述了企业套期、最优激励合约以及信息披露策略等方面的问题。分别讨论了管理者对于所拥有的企业风险暴露以及套期策略等优势信息向股东采取披露和不披露 ,以及“充分”披露和“非充分”披露等多种情况下管理者与股东的效用 。

Corporate hedging is strategies that corporate adopt to remove all the uncertainty with the earning cash flow by using the financial innovation product and financial derivatives. This paper, based on the agent conflict of the shareholder and manage, studies the corporate hedging, optimal incentive contract and information disclosure. The utility of the shareholder and manager and the optimal incentive contract is analyzed respectively under some condition that the manager provides the shareholder information disclosure, no disclosure, complete disclosure, incomplete disclosure.