控制权安排与国有企业经理腐败

Controlling Right Arrangement and State-Owned Enterprise Managers' Corruption

经理腐败问题已经成为制约中国国有企业改革和发展的巨大障碍。如何通过对国有企业经理腐败行为进行深入的经济学分析 ,以寻求制约经理腐败的有效途径 ,无疑是当前中国经济体制改革所面临的极具理论价值和实践意义的课题。我们从政府权腐败和代理权腐败互为供求的角度 ,深层次分析国有企业经理腐败的经济制度根源并发现 ,中国特色的企业控制权安排是国有企业经理腐败的主要根源。因为 ,在政府官员控制国有企业人事权的现实中 ,经理为了追加国有资产控制权收益 ,必然积极进行控制权投资 ,贿赂政府官员。政府官员为了个人利益 ,必然更加积极地进行权钱交易。据此 ,解决国有企业经理腐败问题 。

The problem of managers corruption has become a big obstacle in which constrains the reform and development of Chinese state owned enterprises. How to analyze the behavior of SOE managers corruption deeply in economic way, and to find a effective way to constrain managers corruption, this will be indubitable a task of confronting to Chinese economic system reform with important theoretical and practical meanings. Based on the related research of inside and outside scholars, and from the views of mutual supply and demand of government corruption and agency corruption, this paper will deeply analyze the root of state owned enterprise managers corruption. We find that enterprise controlling right arrangement of Chinese characteristic is the main root of state owned enterprise managers corruption. This is because in the actual condition of governors controlling of the personnel right of state owned enterprise, in order to pursue the benefit of state owned assets controlling right, state owned enterprise managers have to invest in controlling right zealously, and to bribe governors. Governors then would more actively conduct power money trading. Therefore, we argue that to resolve the problem of state owned enterprise managers corruption, we should reform the economic system arrangement from the angle of unreasonable factors.