摘要
基于完全信息静态博弈模型和完全信息动态博弈模型 ,分别建立了在政府不参与和参与博弈两种情况下的伴有环境税收的寡头垄断竞争模型 ,对模型分别求得其纳什均衡和子博弈精炼纳什均衡解 ,并分析了政府的最优税率和企业的最优均衡产量的对策问题 .
In the oligopoly market two models of competition with environmental tax are built on the basis of the Cournot static game and the Stackelberg Dynamic game with complete information. The two models show the government′s participation in and out of the game. The Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium are analyzed respectively. Relations between the government′s optimal tax ratio and the firms′ optimal production are discussed. The conclusion is applicable for other kinds of taxes.
出处
《华中科技大学学报（自然科学版）》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2001年第6期43-45,共3页
Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology(Natural Science Edition)
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目 (6 0 0 740 33)
