具有多优先级多服务网络的激励价格控制

Inventive Pricing Problem of Multi-service Networks with Multi-priority-level

运用 Stackelberg对策中的激励原理 ,研究具有多优先级的多服务网络系统的价控问题。提出了具有管理者的两用户两优先级的激励模型 ,给出了确定激励参数的方法。将此方法扩展到多优先级的情形 ,推导出互联激励参数矩阵。通过数值例子说明了激励价控策略的有效性。

The pricing problem of equilibrium of multi-service priority-based networks is studied by means of the principle of incentive strategy in Stackelberg game theory. The existing results on two-user two-level Nash problem are introduced briefly. One-leader multi-user multi-level incentive model is proposed based on the two-level one. The design for the incentive coefficient matrices is presented for both multi-user two-level and multi-level models. Numerical example demonstrates the efficiency of the incentive pricing strategy.