摘要
在信贷市场上 ,银行和企业分别扮演着委托人和代理人的角色 ,两者存在着信息不对称。重点探讨了信贷市场中由于信息不对称性而产生的道德风险、逆向选择、机制设计、寻租行为等经济学问题及其解决办法。
On the credit market,the bank and enterprise play individually the roles of principal-agent,and there are asymmetric information for each other. Because of the asymmetric information, this paper studies emphatically economics problems such as moral hazard, adverse selection, mechanism design and seeding rent behavior etc in the credit market and the solution to them.
出处
《湘潭工学院学报（社会科学版）》
2001年第2期4-6,10,共4页
Social Science Journal of Xiangtan Polytechnic University
