摘要
政府在社会可持续发展中为保证环境公共物品的质量 ,需要对企业排污进行管制。管制企业生产污染包括激励机制与监控机制。本文讨论了在信息不对称情况下政府如何实现对企业的有效监控 ,应用委托 -代理理论框架分析了政府与企业的博弈 ,建立了监督、举报调查与罚款相结合的监控机制模型。讨论了这些机制之间的关系 ,得出罚款与监督和举报调查之间存在替代性 。
In order to guarantee the quality of environmental public goods, in the social sustainable development, the government needs to regulate the pollution by firms. The regulation of production pollution by firms includes incentive mechanism and supervising mechanism. How to supervise firms effectively under the asymmetric information condition is discussed in the paper. The Principal-Agent theory is applied to analyze the game between the government and firms. The combination model of the monitoring, victim's report & investigation and fines is proposed in the paper. The relations between these mechanisms are analyzed in the paper.It is shown that there exists substitution between monitoring, investigation and fines.The propositions of the optimal model solutions are shown in the paper.
出处
《系统工程理论方法应用》
1998年第4期63-67,共5页
Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications
