对称信息情况下开发可再生资源的激励问题研究

Incentive Contract of Exploiting Regenerable Resources on the Condition of Symmetric Information

本文用委托—代理理论研究了对称信息情况下政府管理可再生资源开发活动的激励问题。通过建立并分析资源可持续开发的数学模型表明 ,政府实施生态平衡管理有助于降低开发人对可再生资源的开发努力度 ,在政府及开发人都是风险中性的条件下 ,激励合同不仅依赖于所观察到的产出 ,而且依赖于生物种群的内禀增长率。

This article discusses how the government manages the regenerable resource development on the condition of symmetric information with entrust-agent theory. The mathematical model shows that ecological balance management by the government benefits to cut down the exertion of expolitation. When the government and exploiters are in the neutral risk, the incentive contract will depend not only on the output value observed, but also on the intrinsic growth of the population.