单一定价和歧视定价下的内生序贯进入模拟

Simulation of endogenous sequential entry under mill pricing and discriminatory pricing

模拟了在水平差异(horizontal differentiation)产品行业中厂商序贯(sequential)进入的情况. 当厂商采用单一定价策略时,早期进入厂商的定位趋向于城市的中心,迫使后续进入厂商定位城市边缘;与之相反,当厂商采用歧视定价策略时,早期进入的厂商趋向于城市的边缘,而让后续进入的厂商定位于城市中心. 另外,与单一定价情况相比,歧视定价下所形成的进入避垒(barrier)明显要高而厂商的利润明显要小.

A sequential entry of industries with horizontal product differentiation is simulated in the paper. Under uniform pricing, early entrants will locate themselves around the center, inducing later firms to locate closer to the boundaries. On the contrary, under discriminatory pricing, early entrants will locate themselves close to the boundaries, forcing later firms to locate towards the center. The entry barrier is higher and profits are lower under discriminatory pricing.