摘要
讨论国有企业可能存在的三种委托代理关系的模型 .第一种是根本不存在委托人与代理人最优解的模型;第二种是适合市场经济环境的体现,现激励相容约束在非对称信息下委托人—代理人双方博弈的最优解模型;第三种就是代理人以企业、国家效用为自己最大效用的企业家效用乘数模型 .
Discuss three entrustment- attorney model of the state- own enterprises.First:There is no optimum solution in the entrustment- attorney model.Senond:There is a optimum solution model.The optimum solution is a result that entrustment- attorney parties game on as ymmetry information,the model embodies encourage and restrain machine- processed and suits market economy circumstances.Third:This is multiple model that takes notional enterprise′ s usefulness for his maximum usefulness.
出处
《沈阳工业大学学报》
EI
CAS
2001年第2期159-161,共3页
Journal of Shenyang University of Technology