摘要
程颐、朱囊的“格物致知”理论本质上是一种道德形上学，其本质论前提是“理”的本体论，其认识论前提是主体和客体的相对二分。由于这一理论在力倡认识自然事物的同时却未能提供切实有效的认知方法，因而未能实现向近代科学认识论的转型。
The modern epistemological method is used to criticize Cheng-Yi and Zhu-Xi' s theory of 'Studying Things To Acquire Knowledge' in this paper. The author puts forwards that their theory has not offered effective means to study the essence of natural things, therefore it can not transform into modern scientific epistemology.
出处
《徐州师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
2001年第3期123-126,共4页
Journal of Xuzhou Normal University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)
