周期性与长期一致性抉择:信贷集中及其政策含义

Business Cycle and Long-Run Consistent Choice:Credit Concentration and Policy Suggetstions

由于宏观经济周期和自身风险管理的双向塑造作用 ,四大国有商业银行普遍上收了信贷管理权限 ,将有限的资金重点投向“大城市、大企业、大项目”和优质客户 ,出现了所谓“信贷集中”现象。本文通过对银行信贷资金“双向集中”动因和经济后果的分析 ,得出以下基本结论 :第一 ,信贷资金“双向集中”是银行改善经济效益的理性选择 ,就金融机构个体而言是正确的方向。第二 ,国有商业银行的寡头特征将信贷集中的长周期化。第三 ,必须避免相机抉择政策 ,坚持长期一致性抉择 ,通过市场化手段 (而非行政手段 )对现有的信贷管理方式进行微调。具体调整思路为 :一是中央银行要对商业银行的信贷行为进行窗口指导 ,促进其加大对中小企业发展和居民消费的信贷投入 ,对信贷过分集中提出道义劝告。二是建立一个多层次多元化的金融组织体系。使其能够提供覆盖全社会各经济主体需要的、有效的金融服务 ,提高信贷市场的竞争性。三是因地制宜适当扩大基层商业银行贷款审批权限 ,建立完备的激励机制。

The credit concentration, credit decision-making concentrated to higher level office and credit funds concentrated to larger cities, larger firms, larger projects and higher quality clients, is caused by the macroeconomic cycle and micro risk management in individual banks. This paper discusses the causes and economic and institutional consequences of credit concentration, and draws following results. Firstly, credit concentration is rational decision of individual banks. Secondly, the Monopoly of state-owned commercial banks shapes the concentration to be a long cycle. Thirdly, the public policy should keep consistent in long-run rather than discretion, such as moral persuade, competitive market construction and incentive introduction.