基于不同成本下的伯川德双头定价博奕

On Different Costs-based Brand Double-end Pricing Game

利用改进的霍特林双头定价模型 ,给出了具有不同成本的伯川德价格博奕的唯一纳什均衡 ,并得出了两寡头在均衡时存在正利润ⅡⅠ (>0 ) ,从而更加合理地解释了不变成本下的“伯川德悖论”。

Using improved Hotelling double pricing model, this paper works out the only Nash Balance of Brand pricing game with different costs and comes to the conclusion that there exists positive profitΠI*(>0) when two single ends meet. Therefore, it explains Brand Paradox under steady cost more reasonably.