摘要
本文运用动态博弈理论 ,通过构建信贷博弈模型 ,分别从完全且完美信息动态博弈和完全但不完美信息动态博弈两个方面 ,分析了我国商业银行与企业在信贷上的决策互动关系 ,并在分析的基础上得出了一些有益的启示。
By using the dynamic game theory and constructing the credit game model,this paper analyses the interacting relationship in making credit decision between our country's commercial banks and enterprises.The analysis is made in two aspects:the completely perfect information dynamics and the complete but not perfect information dynamic games,and derives some beneficial revelations from the analysis..
出处
《现代财经(天津财经大学学报)》
2001年第11期8-11,共4页
Modern Finance and Economics:Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
关键词
动态博弈理论
信贷博弈模型
商业银行
银行信贷
Credit Game
Complete and Perfect Information Dynamic Game
Complete but not Perfect Dynamic Game