论经理人股票期权激励的有效性

On Effectiveness of Executive Stock Option Iucentive

现代公司制企业最典型的委托人———代理人问题是公司的经营者 ,尤其是高层管理人员与公司的所有者———股东之间的利益冲突。为了解决这种冲突 ,代理理论提出 ,制定补偿政策会激励管理人员去选择和实施可以增加股东财富的活动。经理人股票期权制度就是此种补偿措施之一。本文分析经理人股票期权所提供的激励的程度和有效性。我们首先给出了经理人股票期权制度的含义和特征 ,指出经理人股票期权实际上是基于公司股票的看涨期权 ,然后建立了一个分析模型 ,模型的基本结论是 :经理人股票期权确实对公司总裁有激励作用 ,但这种激励作用是有限度的 ;这种有限度的激励作用的发挥受许多因素的影响 ,如市场环境、企业的风险特征等 ;经理人股票期权制度的激励作用是有条件的 ,如资本市场特别是股票市场要有效率 ,亦即股票价格要能正确地反映公司的经营业绩 ,在这种情况下 ,股票市场的定价功能才能正确且充分地发挥作用。最后利用美国的资料 ,为模型的基本结论提供了经验证据。

This paper analyzes the degree and efectiveness of incentive provided by Executive Stock Option (ESO). First it gives definition and character of ESO system, points out that ESO is in fact a bull option based on company's stock, and sets up an analysis model. The basic conclusion of the model is the following: ESO is exactly playing an incentive role to the president of a company, but it is limited; and it is effected by many factors, such as market environment, enterprises' risk features, and so on; it is conditional, such as, stock market should be efficient, and under these conditions the pricing function of stock market then plays a correct and full role. At the end, with a USA's data an empirical evidence for the basic conclusion of the model is given.