产品质量-成本博弈模型:定价策略

A Game Model of Product Quality/Cost: the Strategies of Pricing

产品质量信息的不对称使消费者付费失去了可信的基础 .非诚实型企业依据其低成本优势c1-c0 的程度 ,选择“低质量 -低质量”或“高质量 -低质量”战略 .与质量优良相联系的高生产成本使诚实型企业在博弈中处于不利境地 ,因而必须作出两类决策 :价格竞争还是非价格竞争、始销优惠抑或高价位销售 .两期模型分析了不同竞争手段和定价取向的应用条件 ,并推导出始销优惠价格折扣率

The asymmetry of the information of the product quality makes the consumers lose their trust worthiness to pay for a product. The non\|honest firms select the 'low\|low' or 'high\|low' quality strategy according to the \$c\-1\|c\-0\$, that is, the lower cost of the production. In the game of the quality, the honest firms are in an unfavorable situation because of the high cost that is relative to the high quality. Therefore, it must make two strategic decisions--the pricing competition or the non\|pricing competition, and the low\|price retails or the high\|price retails. While the two\|stage models have been scrutinized through the different competition strategies and the applied conditions on pricing tendency, the optical discount rate, \$k\$, has been derived from the theoretical analysis.