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关于“为设计认证协议的一个简明逻辑”一文的注记(英文) 被引量:1

Noteson'ASimpleLogicforAuthenticationProtocolDesign'
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摘要 Buttyan等人提出了一个简洁的逻辑 ,他们把它用于改进 Woo- L am协议 ,并且未证明地声称 :改进后的协议是抗协议与自身的交互攻击的 .为表明他们的结论是不正确的 ,找到了改进协议的两个不同的攻击 ,并详细解释如何加以实现 .构造攻击的方式除了要求更细致之外 ,与 Debbabi等人的方式在本质上是相似的 .进一步的分析表明Debbabi等人的逻辑没有足够的能力推理交互攻击 。 Buttyan et al. proposed a simple logic and used it to revise Woo Lam protocol; without proving, they claimed that revised protocol is resistant against the interaction attacks between a protocol and itself. In this paper, in order to show that their results are incorrect, two different attacks on revised protocol are found out and set out in detail for their implementations. The fashions to construct the two attacks are essentially analogous to the ones described by Debbabi etc. except more complicated than them. The further analysis show that the logic of Buttyan etc. has no enough capacity to sufficiently capture protocol flaws, which stem from interaction of protocol itself. This logic needs to be improved.
出处 《软件学报》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2001年第11期1581-1585,共5页 Journal of Software
基金 国家重点基础研究973发展规划No.G19990 35 80 2 国家杰出青年基金No.6 0 0 2 5 2 0 5~~
关键词 义互攻击 安全性 模态逻辑 认证协议 Woo-Lam协议 protocol interaction attack security modal logic analysis
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参考文献1

  • 1Perrig A,Proc the 13th Computer Security Foundations Workshop,2000年

同被引文献6

  • 1张爱新,杨明福,李生红,李建华.一种认证安全性的分析与设计逻辑[J].上海交通大学学报,2004,38(z1):174-177. 被引量:1
  • 2BUTTYAN L, STAAMANN S, and WIHELM U. A simple logic for authentication protocol design[A]. In Proceedings of the IEEE CS Computer Security Foundations Workshop,Massachusetts, U. S. A, IEEE Computer Society Press, 1998:153-162.
  • 3CHOI Hyun-Jin. Security protocol design by composition[D].Cambridge, United Kingdoms University of Cambridge, 2006.
  • 4GUTTMAN J. Security protocol design via authentication tests[A]. In Proceedings of 15th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, Canada, IEEE Computer Society Press, 2002:92-103.
  • 5SONG D. An Automatic Approach for Building Secure Systems[D]. California, U.S. A: Unlversity of California, 2002.
  • 6LOWE G. Breaking and fixing the Necdham-Schroeder publickey protocol using FDR [A]. In Proceedings of TACAS.Passau, Germany, Springer Verlag, 1996: 147-166.

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