在位企业最优事后许可策略的比较

Comparison between Optimal Ex-Post Licensing Policies for an Incumbent Firm

研究一个在位企业面对两个潜在进入者时的最优事后许可策略 .潜在进入者可以通过开发劣于在位企业已有技术的替代技术进入市场 .两个潜在进入者开发替代技术的结局可能是都不成功、只有一个成功或都成功 .文中先后在替代技术仅在固定生产成本、单位生产成本或产品质量上劣于在位企业技术这三种情况下 ,研究两个潜在进入者开发替代技术的每种结局出现时在位企业的最优事后许可策略 .研究表明 ,面对进入者开发替代技术的同一结局 ,在替代技术劣等性的三种表现形式下 ,在位企业的许可策略可能是迥异的 .

This paper derives optimal ex-post licensing policies for an incumbent monopolist faced with two potential competitors who can enter the market by developing some substitute, but inferior, production technology. The outcome of the two potential entrants developing substitute technology is that none, only one or both of them succeed. Under every of the three cases that the substitute technology is inferior to the incumbent's in terms of fixed costs, unit costs or product quality, the optimal ex-post licensing policies for the incumbent are discussed when every outcome of the entrants' development is realized. It is shown that, for the same outcome, the optimal licensing policies may be quite different under various types of inferiority.