摘要
从 1 98 0年代初到 1 990年代中期实施的“放权让利”金融管理机制 ,造成信贷规模扩张愿望强烈 ,管理者风险意识淡薄 ,不良贷款持续上升。 1 990年代后期 ,金融机构强化风险管理意识 ,建立内控制度 ,引进惩罚机制 ,其结果是信贷市场从过去非理性扩张走向了保守经营 ,金融机构陷入共同推诿责任、信贷萎缩的困境。本文从经济学角度分析了我国金融体制改革的缺陷及其出现上述困境的原因 。
The financial management mechanism--'the release right to and the transrer profit to enterprise',which had been executed between early 1980'and mid1990's,led to the strong desire to expand credit scale ,weak recognition for the potential risks on the part of administrators, and continuous rise of bad loans.In late 1990's , with the strengthening of risk management, the establishment of internal control system, and the introduction of punishment, loan market has advanced, from irrational expansion to conservative management ,and financial institutes are beset with credit shrinkage and shifting responsibilities against each other.This paper analyzes the defect of Chinese financial system reform and the cause for the abovementioned dilemma from economics perspective,and puts forward the idea that long term incentive mechanism is the effective remedy for the defect of our present financial system management.
出处
《上海财经大学学报》
2001年第6期22-27,共6页
Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics