摘要
文章分别用成本收益分析法和委托代理关系分析法解释了企业的融资偏好问题,结果发现:企业偏好于股票融资并不是因为股票融资成本低,而是因为在内部人控制下,股票融资对管理者约束小,而债券融资对管理者约束性强。
The article explains the issue of ent erprise financing preference with t he cost -benefit analysis and the prin-cipal -agent analysis.It finds out t hat the low cost of stock financing co uld not contribute to the enterprise preference in stock financing.The weak constra int to management in stock financing under the insider control leads to th e stock financing,whereas,bond financing has a strong constraint to management.
出处
《河北经贸大学学报》
2002年第1期61-66,共6页
Journal of Hebei University of Economics and Business