摘要
为促进竞争对手进入由在位者支配的网络产业 ,各国政府往往会制订一些管理定价规则 .最常见的是对等收费 ,即对互联各方索取相同的接收费用 ,消除网内和网间的价格差别 ,使垄断可能性降低 .据此 ,以电信市场为例 ,评估对等收费对网络间价格竞争的影响 .在古诺模型和豪泰林模型的基础上 ,建立两个互联网络的价格竞争模型 .在对称均衡下 ,网间电话的价格超过网内电话价格 ,这种内部电话折扣 ,即网络外部性促使市场倾斜 ,使产业走向垄断 .通过对接收等价收取费用 ,即对等收费 ,消除了网内和网间价格差别 ,使垄断可能性降低 .
It evaluates the effectiveness of the reciprocity pricing rule intended to promote entry into a network industry dominated by an incumbent carrier is studied.Drawing on the work of Cournot and Hotelling,a model of competiton between two interconnected networks are builded.In a symmetric equilibrium,the price of cross-network calls exceeds the price of internal calls.This tends to 'tip' the industry to a monopoly equlibrium as a network externality.Byequalizing charges for terminating calls,reciprocity eliminates differences between internal and cross network prices and makes monopoly less likely.
出处
《复旦学报(自然科学版)》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2001年第6期665-669,共5页
Journal of Fudan University:Natural Science
基金
复旦大学三年行动计划交叉重点学科"电子商务"研究基金资助项目