未来收益不确定情形下委托代理基数确定的激励机制设计

Incentive Mechanism Design for Deciding the Base of a Principal-Agent Contract in Case of Uncertain Future Revenue

本文利用信息不对称的博弈分析方法建立了未来收益不确定情形下委托代理基数确定的激励机制设计模型，所得结果对国有资本委托代理关系中“完全放权合约” 的有效性研究具有一定参考价值。

In the paper, it studied an incentive mechanism design model for deciding the base of a principal agent contract in case of uncertain future revenue by means of game theory analysis method to information asymmetrical problem It is of some importance for further studying the validity of 'complete contract about assignment of residual claim' in principal - agent relationship of governmental capital.