民主制的悖论与准国有制的选择:对农村信用社体制的现状观察与改革思考

The Alternative to Democratic Paradox or Quasi State Ownership: A Study on RCCs' Current Situation and Reform

本文试图从农村信用社的民主管理制度本身进行探讨 ,研究民主管理制度与当前农村金融的相容性问题。本文的基本判断是 :正如自由竞争可能导致垄断一样 ,合作制所体现的民主管理是一种一厢情愿的制度构想 ,其所导致的内部人控制 (或农村信用社主任的“土皇帝”特征 )是民主制的悖论 ;因此 ,如果我们继续坚持农村信用社继续为三农服务的基本方向 ,必须在现实上放弃空想式的民主制度 ,实行农村信用社的国有或准国有化 ,在整体金融领域搞“反向剪刀差”。

This paper analyzes the democratic arrangement Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs) and its compatible to current rural financial system. The conclusions are following. Firstly, given the knowledge dominance of managers of RCCs, the voting system can only lead to a democratic paradox, i.e. internal control problem. Secondly, an alternative governance structure with quasi state ownership is needed to curb managers' moral hazard. Thirdly, reasonable subsidization is feasible to meet rural credit demand.