摘要
风险资本家与企业家的合作是风险投资成功的必要条件。本文设计了一个二阶段风险投资模型 ,并通过对他们之间的动态博奕分析 ,表明风险企业的增值潜力与采取不合作的机会主义策略为企业家带来的个人利益影响博奕均衡的实现 。
Co operation between the entrepreneur and venture capitalist is necessary for venture capital. Based on the two stage investing model and the analysis of dynamic game between them, we suggest that the realization of Nash equilibrium depends on the value increasing of the venture enterprise and the entrepreneur's benefit from taking opportunitical strategies. Furthermore, we discuss the improvement of the Co operation machanism between them.
出处
《预测》
CSSCI
2001年第5期24-26,共3页
Forecasting
关键词
风险投资
企业家
风险资本家
合作
动态博奕
模型
venture capital
entrepreneur
venture capitalist
Co operation
dynamic game
