对企业高级管理人员的监督机制

Research on CEO Supervise System

由于外部和内部董事在风险态度上的差距 ,在监督的力度上也存在差距 ,讨论了董事会对企业高级管理人员 (CEO)的监督问题 .利用委托代理理论 ,通过对管理人员能力的判断 ,分析了内部和外部董事在监督上的这种差异 ,得出了内部和外部董事对管理人员的监督频率 ,及各种因素对监督强度的影响关系 .利用 Black- Scholes的期权计算公式 ,给出了

To inspire and restrict CEO is an important problem in modern economics. How the boards of directors supervise the CEO was discussed in the paper. As exterior director and interior director have different risk utility, the intending to monitor is different. The difference of intending of monitor was showed and the relationship of monitor and director's utility was given. The option value of manager wage was analyzed by using the option equation of Black Scholes.