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法律制度的信誉基础 被引量:821

Reputational Foundation of the Legal System
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摘要 法律和信誉是维持市场有序运行的两个基本机制。事实上 ,与法律相比 ,信誉机制是一种成本更低的维持交易秩序的机制。特别是 ,在许多情况下 ,法律是无能为力的 ,只有信誉能起作用。进一步 ,法律的判决和执行依赖于当事人对信誉的重视程度。当人们没有积极性讲信誉的时候 ,法律就失去了信誉基础。在商业社会 ,企业是信誉的载体。中国企业不重视信誉的原因在于产权不明晰和政府对经济的任意干预。法律制度的运行也离不开执法者的信誉。为了使执法者重视自己的信誉 ,有必要在司法系统引入竞争机制。 Law and reputations are two principal mechanisms of market orders. Reputations are self-enforcing and more cost-effective as compared with law. In many occasions, law is helpless and only reputations can play a role. Furthermore, both the legal judgement and the legal enforceability rely on the reputational concerns of the parties involved. When people do not care for their reputations, law cannot be effective.In the commercial circle, the firm is assumed as a reputation bearer. The lack of reputational concerns of Chinese enterprises root in the insecurity of property rights and the governmental interventions. Reputations of law enforcers are also crucial for the legal system. For law enforcers to have incentives to build up their reputations, it is necessary to introduce competition into the judicial system.
作者 张维迎
出处 《经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2002年第1期3-13,92,共12页 Economic Research Journal
关键词 法律 信誉 企业 产权 政府 竞争机制 Legal system Reputation Firm Ownership Government
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参考文献20

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