摘要
利用三阶段动态博弈模型 ,研究了存在网络外部性的市场中 ,拥有主流技术标准的主导厂商对其技术标准的控制策略。发现 ,在弱势厂商存在兼并可能性的情况下 。
Through a three stages game model, the paper, based on the network externality, analyzes the control strategy to the mainstream technology standard of the dominant producter, who owns the standard. The result shows that given the possilility of merger between the fringes, the selection of dominant producter mainly depends on its advantage on installed base and the strength of network externality.
出处
《系统工程理论方法应用》
2001年第3期189-193,共5页
Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications
关键词
技术标准
兼并
网络外部性
博弈论
technology standard
merger
network externality
game theory