从博弈的角度看中小股东解决纠纷的过程——从一个流行模型的残缺谈起

Observing Medium and Minor Shareholder'sDispute Solved Procedure from a Game Angle--Speaking from a Popular but Incomplete Model

经研究发现 ,张维迎教授在 2 0 0 1年第五版的《博弈论与信息经济学》中所借用的承诺要胁诉讼博弈例子中对诉讼费用的处理有点不妥 ,便作出了适当的调整 ,但却得出了令人沮丧的结论 :承诺要胁诉讼不成立 !继续研究发现只有打破这种败诉风险由当事人承担的机制 ,才能传递出有力量的信号 ,才能做到真正的威胁 ,那就是建立“生死与共”的竞争性的律师定价机制和保费率真正是胜诉率信号的诉讼费用保险机制与最经济的诉讼程序与非诉讼程序、保障其实现的机制和可供的备选机制。

By the research of relevant questions, it seemed to be a little improper to deal with the expense in litigation among the cited example of commitment nuisance lawsuit game in the 'game theory and information economics' created by Professor Zhang, which has been published the fifth edition until now. Then, by the appropriate adjustment again, it draws the following conclusion: the commitment is unable to reach the object! and only if breaking through this kind of mechanism that parties bear whole failure risk, could it transmit and get off the strong signal, could it accomplish the real threat. That is to set up competitive attorney fee pricing mechanism and the mechanism that rate of insurance expense can completely reflect the successful lawsuit probability, which share a common destiny and the most economic contentious procedure and not contentious procedure and ensure its mechanism of realization and alternative mechanism.