水平差异产品的内生定价策略选择

Endogenous Pricing Strategies of Horizontal Differentiated Products

本文分析了一个存在定价策略选择下的三阶段Hotelling双头垄断模型 ,其中厂商可以选择采用单一定价策略或者歧视定价策略。模型的子博弈精炼纳什均衡表明厂商或者同时采用单一定价策略 ,或者同时采用歧视一价策略。当歧视定价的边际成本相对单一定价的边际成本不太高 ,或者消费乾注重产品特性差异时 ,厂商会同时选择歧视定价策略 ,尽管单一定价下厂商的利润要明显高于歧视定价下的利润 ;当歧视定价的边际成本相对较高或者消费者不太注重产品特性差异时 ,单一定价将成为厂商的最优选择。最后本文从社会最优的角度分析比较了两种这价策略下的社会净福利水平。

This paper analyzes a three stage Hotelling duopoly model with endogenous pricing strategies,where firms can choose uniform pricing or discriminatory pricing The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium shows that firms choose either uniform pricing or discriminatory pricing simultaneously When the difference between the marginal costs of discriminatory pricing and uniform pricing is not too large,or when consumers pay attention to product characteristic,firms will choose discriminatory pricing,although the profits under uniform pricing are larger than those under discriminatory pricing Whereas,when the difference between the two marginal costs is large,or when consumers don′t care about product characteristic,firms will choose uniform pricing Finally,the paper compares social net welfare under two pricing strategies