内部感觉的效能边界——论叔本华意志认识论的内在矛盾

The Effective Range of the Inner Consciousness ——The Intrinsic Conflicts of Schopenhauer's Epistemology

叔本华将康德的“自在之物”原创性地置换为他自己的“意志” ,这在西方哲学史上不啻又一次哥白尼革命 ,德国哲学由此而走上了一条非理性主义的道路。不过 ,这一革命的完成并非轻而易举 :叔本华必须证明不可知的“自在之物”在被说成是“意志”之后如何是可知的。本文梳理和评论了叔本华研究者对“意志”之可知性的怀疑、批评和修正 ,并展示了叔本华自己在解决这一问题时的武断和犹豫 ,最后试图说明 ,问题之关键不是学术性的 ,而是在学术性之后所隐藏的思想动机和历史意图。本文所涉及的论争可能对认识中国哲学史上理学与心学之争有一定参考作用。

A.Schopenhauer's substitution of his original conception \%will in itself\% for Kant's \%things in themselves,\%can be viewed as another Copernican Revolution in the history of the Western philosophy,and thereafter the German philosophy was shifted to a direction of irrationalism.Academically,however,this revolution was not very successful:Schopenhauer failed to convince us that how his \%will in itself\% can be known while Kant's \%things in themselves\% not.This essay critically reviews the suspicion,question and correction done by scholars to the knowability of \%will in itself\% declared by Schopenhauer,and exposes Schopenhauer's confidence,ignorance of and sometimes hesitation with it.Lastly,the essay suggests that attentions shouldn't be paid more to the contradictions,logical or emotional,in Schopenhauer's epistemology,but to the hidden motives why he insisted upon the knowability of the \%will.\%Besides,this essay might in a way illuminate the controversies between the Song\|Ming schools of Platonic Ideas and of Universal Mind.