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竞争上岗企业家选拔制度的博弈分析 被引量:1

STUDY ON MECHANISM OF SELECTING ENTREPRENEUR BY USING GAME THEORY
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摘要 首先分析了现代企业家制度中竞争上岗机制的重要意义及障碍 ,通过建立和分析基于不完全信息下的岗位竞争机制的静态博弈模型 ,并与任命上岗模型进行了比较 ,指出两种不同激励机制对员工和企业的影响 。 We first analyze the important meaning and the barriers of selecting entrepreneur mechanism in human resources′ management,then give a new game model of competing for post by comparing with the appointing model.We get some results about incentive contract of the enterprise by studying the corresponding effects of the two kinds of incentive mechanism.
作者 魏斌 许立俭
出处 《山东师范大学学报(自然科学版)》 CAS 2002年第1期18-20,共3页 Journal of Shandong Normal University(Natural Science)
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目 ( 70 1710 45 )
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  • 1Milgrom,P., Robert s,J. Econimics,Organnization and Management [M]. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, USA,1992.
  • 2Holmstrom B.Multi-task Principal-Agent Anaslyses.Incentives Contracts,Asset Ownership and Job Design[J].Journal of Low. Economics and Organization, 1991,(7).24-25
  • 3Kim,S.K.,Wang, S., Linear contracts and the double moral hazard[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 1998,82.342-378
  • 4Dessi,R. Start-up finance, monitoring and collusion. IDEL Paper[J], University of Toulouse, USA ,2001

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