摘要
本文针对“委托—代理”关系 ,探讨了我国上市公司实行经理股票期权(ESO)逐步取代传统的工资、奖金和福利等薪酬形式。分析了ESO激励的宏观和微观条件 ,给出了ESO设计方案及其在上市公司的应用 ,最后分析了ESO所带来的正负效应。
This paper deals with the problem of 'Principal-Agent' in the public listed company in China by using Executive Stock Options(ESO) to replace traditional requitals such as salary bonus and welfare.First,we analyze the macro and micro fators in ESO,then give ESO models and discuss its application.Finally we give the effects in the pros and cons of ESO.
